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NOTES

ity, nor dissenting judge objected to an injunction being imposed. 5 The plaintiff in the instant case was only eighteen
years old, had served his probationary sentence, and recently
had married. He had obtained a job, and his employer had
requested that the defendant remove the display."5 The plaintiff's ability to become a productive member of society and
society's interest in the rehabilitative process were impeded by
this continued exposure."
This case demonstrates the difficulty of regulating the extent to which a person may speak the truth when such speech
causes another great distress. The strong competing interests
of privacy and free speech defy easy accomodation. The majority eased its task of balancing these interests by improperly
stressing the distinction between an individual's and the
media's right to disseminate information. However, given the
majority's finding that the defendant was motivated by a desire to harass the plaintiff, this writer believes the defendant's
actions were sanctioned consistently with the Constitution.
Rick Revels

Bellotti-CORPORATIONS'

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

First National Bank of Boston, Iseeking a declaratory judgment, challenged the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute' prohibiting corporations from making political contribu75. Id. at 24, 26, 33. The court did not mention that an injunction is generally
an inappropriate remedy to restrain torts such as defamation or harassment against
the person, nor attempt to justify its action by the finding of special circumstances
and irreparable injury. See Greenberg v. Burglass, 254 La. 1019, 1027, 229 So. 2d 83,
86 (1969). See also LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3601.
76. 355 So. 2d at 29.
77. See, e.g., Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817, 828
(D.C.D.C. 1955); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 538, 483 P.2d
34, 40, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 872 (1971); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 287, 297 P.
91, 93 (1931).
1. The other plaintiffs joining First National Bank of Boston in suing were: New
England Merchants National Bank, the Gillette Co., Digital Equipment Corp., and
Wyman-Gordon Co.
2. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West 1977), provides, inter alia:
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tions or expenditures that promote a candidate or seek to influence the public on any question not, in the language of the
statute, "materially affecting" the business property or assets
of the corporation. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
sustained the statute, holding that business corporations can
claim no first amendment protection for noncommercial
speech.3 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, five
to four, holding that since the statutory prohibition of corporate speech was not justified by any compelling state interest,
it unconstitutionally restricted the free flow of political information. FirstNationalBank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S.765
(1978).
Corporations have always been considered artificial persons in the contemplation of the law.' Whether corporations are
entitled to the same constitutional rights accorded natural persons has been a troublesome, at times metaphysical, issue in
American constitutional law.
In 1817, in the Dartmouth College case,5 Chief Justice
no business corporation
No corporation carrying on the business of a bank, ...
incorporated under the laws of or doing business in the commonwealth and no
officer or agent acting in behalf of any corporation mentioned in this section,
shall directly or indirectly give, pay, expend or contribute, or promise to give,
pay, expend or contribute, any money or valuable thing for the purpose of
aiding, promoting or preventing the nomifiation or election of any person to
public office, or aiding, promoting or antagonizing the interests of any political
party, or influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the
voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets
of the corporation. No question submitted to the voters solely concerning the
taxation of the income, property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed
materially to affect the property, business or assets of the corporation.
3. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Attorney Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 1977),
rev'd, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). The court stated:
[A] corporation does not have the same First Amendment rights to free
speech as those of a natural person, but, whether its rights are designated
"liberty" rights or "property" rights, a corporation's property and business
interests are entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection. ...
Thus, we hold today that only when a general political issue materially
affects a corporation's business, property or assets may that corporation claim
First Amendment protection for its speech . . ..
Id. at 1270.
4. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
5. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636
(1819).
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Marshall struggled with the constitutional protections granted
corporations under the contract clause. Speaking of a corporation's property rights, Chief Justice Marshall stated that corporations possessed "only those properties which the charter of
its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to
its very existence . . . . But this being does not share in the
civil government of the country, unless that be the purpose for
which it is created."' Thus, it appears that Chief Justice Marshall recognized the very distinction drawn in the Massachusetts statute, i.e., corporations are free to speak on issues directly affecting corporate property but are not free to share in
the civil government of the country through the exercise of
protected free speech. Later, the Court indicated that only
those rights given by the corporate charter or those rights essential to the full enjoyment of the main object of the corporate
charter are protected. 8 The cases under the contract clause
gave protection to a corporation for property rights granted by
its charter but intimated that corporations do not possess the
general civil rights belonging to natural persons.' "The chief
point of difference between the natural and the artificial person
is that the former may do whatever is not forbidden by law; the
latter can do only what is authorized by its charter."'
The fourteenth amendment, primarily through the privileges and immunities clause and the due process clause, is the
vehicle through which first amendment restrictions are imposed upon the states." For a corporation to be protected from
state infringement of its first amendment rights, it must come
6. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, provides: "No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts ......
A corporate charter is considered a
contract within the meaning of the contract clause. Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy
R.R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1876).
7. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636.
8. Pearshall v. Great N.R.R., 161 U.S. 646, 661 (1896).
9. See, e.g., id. See also Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879); West River
Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518 (1819).
10. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Harris, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 65, 81 (1870).
11. See, e.g., West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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within the protection accorded by the fourteenth amendment.
The privileges and immunities clause provides: "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States .

... 12 The Court

has held that the term "citizens," as it appears in this clause,
applies to only natural persons, members of the body politic,
and not to artificial creations of the state. 3 Thus, corporations
are not entitled by this clause to assert privileges and immunities secured to "citizens" against state legislation.
The due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment provide that no "State [shall] deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of the
law; nor deny to any person the equal protection of the laws."' 4
Roscoe Conkling, a former member of the Joint Congressional
Committee which drafted the fourteenth amendment, told the
Court in oral argument in 1882 that the drafters intended to
include corporations within the meaning of the word "person"
as it appears in the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment.' 5 Four years later, in Santa
Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad,'1 Chief Justice Waite,
speaking for a unanimous Court, announced:
The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provisions in the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws, applies to these corporations.We are all of the opinion that it does.' 7
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
13. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). See also Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496 (1939); Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557 (1899).
12.

14.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).

15. Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the FourteenthAmendment, 47 YALE
L.J. 371 (1938). See San Mateo County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1885).
Roscoe Conkling twice declined a seat on the Supreme Court. He submitted a manuscript record of the committee to support his argument.
16. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
17. Id. at 396 (emphasis added). But see Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) ;Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander,
337 U.S. 562, 576 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Both justices vigorously denied that
corporations were persons within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, arguing
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Thus the Court affirmed Conkling's assertion that the
word "person," at least within the meaning of the equal protection guaranty, includes corporations. Later, in a number of
cases, the Court held that corporations were also persons
within the meaning of the due process clause, but, significantly, protection under this clause was limited to rights directly related to the corporation's property on the basis that the
"liberty" referred to in the due process clause is the liberty of
natural, not artificial, persons.'" The scope of the constitutional
protection accorded corporations through the due process
clause encompassed corporate property and corporate economic interest but not the general civil liberties possessed by
natural persons.'"
The next dramatic development occurred in Grosjean v.
American Press Co., Inc. 0 Justice Sutherland, writing for a
unanimous Court, held that a Louisiana tax on a corporate
newspaper violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment because it abridged the American Press Company's freedom of the press. Justice Sutherland's opinion
granted this protection without squarely addressing the state's
contention that the due process clause protected the "liberty"
of natural persons and not the "liberty" of corporations.', The
that neither the history nor the language of the amendment supported an interpretation of "persons" that includes corporations. Justices Black and Douglas found that
the true purpose of the amendment was to protect human rights, thereby denying
protection to corporations. Both opinions were ignored by the other justices and condemned by the legal press. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMEmcR CONSTITUTION 794
(4th ed. 1970).
18. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenburg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907); Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906);
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
19. B. SWARTZ, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 12-18 (1965).
In its inclusive import . . ., the "liberty" protected by the Constitution comprises all the civil liberties of the individual. Insofar as such liberties include
rights of persons alone, they must pertain only to natural persons . . .. To the
extent that the "liberty" guaranteed by the Constitution embraces property
rights, it protects artificial, as well as natural, persons . . ... [I]tmakes no
difference that the corporate personality is solely a creature of the law.
Id. at 15, 16.
20. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
21. Corporations had previously been held to be persons within the due process
clause, but this protection had been extended only to the corporation's property rights,
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opinion further held that a corporation is a person within the
meaning of the due process and equal protection clauses. More
significantly, the Court emphasized the importance of preserving an "untrammeled press" as a means of informing the public 2 but said nothing about the rights of commercial corporations, other than the press, to speak freely without state restriction. The fact that the newspaper was a corporation seemed
incidental to the Court's extension of first amendment press
protection through the fourteenth amendment.2 3 Thus, only

three years later in Hague v. CI.0. ,11 Justice Stone reiterated
prior opinions in a separate concurring opinion and stated that
corporations cannot claim to be deprived of freedom of speech
because they enjoy no such freedom-the liberty granted by
the due process clause is the liberty of natural, not artificial,
persons.25 This opinion seems to support the proposition that
the Court in Grosjean was primarily concerned with protecting
the press, regardless of its corporate form.
not to the "liberty" through which first amendment protections are imposed on the
states. This is the point the Court failed to address. See text at note 17, supra.
22. The Court gave an abbreviated historical overview of attempted censure and
taxation of the press, concluding that such restrictions were prohibited by the first and
fourteenth amendments. 297 U.S. at 245-49. The Court found the press to be a vital
source of public information and stated: "A free press stands as one of the great
interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to
fetter ourselves." Id. at 250. The opinion seems to stand for the proposition that the
press is protected from state interference by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment and not that corporations,per se, are protected.
23. Brief for Appellee at 16, First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978). The case does not declare that "corporations per se have First Amendment
rights, but merely [recognizes] that natural persons retain their First Amendment
rights even though they publish or distribute their views under corporate auspices."
Id. at 16-17.
24. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
25. Id. at 527. See note 17, supra.
While Justice Stone in his concurring opinion dismissed the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) as not being protected by the liberty of the due process clause, the
majority dismissed the corporation as not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment.
Significantly, neither the majority nor Justice Stone's concurrence made any attempt to distinguish Grosjean. The inconsistency between the two opinions-Grosjean
extending first amendment free press protection to a corporation through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and Hague denying it to the ACLU-can
only be reconciled by the need to protect the press regardless of the form in which it
does business.
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Corporations do not come within the protection for citizens
of the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment, but they are considered to be persons and thus are
protected under the equal protection clause. 6 With the excep7 corporate protection under the due process
tion of Grosjean,1
clause has been extended only to property rights and not to the
general civil "liberties" of natural persons.28 Of course, corporations have been granted other constitutional protections." In
fact, certain types of corporate organizations have been given
first amendment free speech protection. Corporations in the
communications business have been granted freedom of speech
protection because they supply the general public with indispensable information." In such cases, corporations have been
granted protection from state infringement without any discussion of their corporate status; they enjoy first amendment protections despite publishing and distributing their views under
corporate auspices. Additionally, freedom of speech protection
has been granted to non-profit-oriented corporations, such as
the N.A.A.C.P., that are directly engaged in those activities
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.3' This type
26. See text at notes 14-18, supra.
27. See text at notes 20-23, supra.
28. See text at note 18, supra.
29. See General Motors Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977)
(fourth amendment, unreasonable search and seizure); Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956) (fifth amendment, double jeopardy); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (fifth amendment and fourteenth amendment, deprivation
of property without due process).
30. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). It cannot be doubted that motion pictures and newspapers
are a significant medium for communicating ideas, providing information, and disseminating opinion. For this reason, they come within the freedom guaranteed by the first
amendment and protected by the fourteenth amendment from infringement by the
states. This protection has been extended without regard to the speakers' corporate
form.
31. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In Button the Court stated: "We
think [the NAACP] may assert [the protection of the first amendment], because,
though a corporation, it is directly engaged in those activities, claimed to be constitutionally protected, which the statute would curtail . . . . We also think [the NAACP]
has standing to assert the corresponding rights of its members." Id. at 428. In NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the Court stated:
[The NAACP] and its members are in every practical sense identical. The
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of corporation is but a means of advancing its members' political beliefs and ideas,32 and again, protection has been extended
through the fourteenth amendment without reference to corporate status. It is clear that both of these types of corporations
have free speech protection because of their particular purpose.
Significantly, Bellotti3 focuses directly on the corporate
political speech issue. The appellants, national banking associations and business corporations, wanted to spend money to
influence the vote on a referendum proposal to amend the Massachusetts Constitution. Appellants sought to have a Massachusetts statute declared unconstitutional because it prohibited corporate expenditures for the purpose of influencing the
vote on an issue submitted to the general public other than one
"materially affecting any property, business or assets of the
corporation. '" ' 3 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
upheld the validity of the statute, finding no violation of the
first amendment, the due process or equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment, or similar provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution."6 The Supreme Court of the United
States, with Justice Powell writing for the majority, reversed
and held the statute unconstitutional.
Justice Powell dismissed as an "artificial mode of analysis" the rationale of earlier cases 36 holding the "liberty" guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to be only that of natural,
not artificial, persons.3 7 The majority adopted the reasoning of
Association, which provides in its constitution that "[any person who is in
accordance with [its] principles and policies . . ." may become a member, is
but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more
effective the expression of their own views.
357 U.S. at 459. See also In re Primas, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Harrison v. NAACP, 360
U.S. 167 (1959).
32. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
33. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).

34.

MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.

ch. 55, § 8 (West 1977). For the text of section 8, see

note 2, supra.
35. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Attorney Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 1977),
rev'd, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See note 3, supra.
36. See cases cited at note 18, supra.
37. 435 U.S. at 779-80. The Court found that the liberty of speech of the first
amendment is within the liberty safeguarded from invasion by state action by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. To support this analysis the Court cited
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), and Gitlow v.New York, 268 U.S.
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Grosjean31 and channeled first amendment protection to corporations through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court found "practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the first] amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.

'3

The ma-

jority felt that corporations could not be denied freedom of
political speech consistently with this purpose. From this viewpoint, the status of the speaker becomes less significant
because supplying the public with the information and ideas
needed to make informed political decisions is of paramount
importance." Justice Powell, like Justice Sutherland in Grosjean, was primarily concerned with the protection of speech
and press freedoms, not with the corporate nature of the parties."
The majority acknowledged two state interests that might
justify limitations on corporate political advocacy: preservation of the integrity of the electoral process42 and protection of
minority shareholders whose views may conflict with those expressed by the corporate management.43 In recognizing these
interests the Court seems to have assumed that corporate status is relevant in determining if there are sufficient state interests to justify limitations on corporate political speech. However, the Court found neither state interest sufficient to justify
the Massachusetts statute.
The first interest, prevention of corruption, was unsupported by any record or legislative findings that corporate ad652 (1925). Neither decision expressly granted corporationsthis protection; they held
in terms of the general protections of the due process clause.
38. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
39. 435 U.S. at 776, quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,,218 (1966).
40. If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that
the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to decision making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the
speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual. The inherent worth
of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend
upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.
435 U.S. at 777. See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75(1964); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION To SELF-GOVERNMENT 24-26 (1948).
41. See text at notes 20-23, supra.
42. 435 U.S. at 788-89.
43. Id. at 792.
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vocacy threatened to undermine the democratic process." The
Court found that the Massachusetts statute prohibiting appellants from speaking did not achieve the second purported state
interest-protecting minority shareholders. The statute was
underinclusive, as it did not prohibit other types of corporate
advocacy, and overinclusive, as it prohibited corporate action
even if authorized unanimously by the shareholders.4"
Chief Justice Burger joined in the opinion and judgment
of the Court but went beyond the facts to raise additional questions. He feared that if the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court's narrow reading of first amendment protections was
accepted, then speech limitations, similar to those imposed by
the Massachusetts statute, might be extended to persons employing the corporate form to carry on the business of mass
communications.'" This fear seems unfounded as the corporate
press and other forms of corporate mass communications have
long been protected." Burger stated that "the First Amendment does not 'belong' to any definable category of persons or
entities: It belongs to all who exercise its freedoms.""
Justice White, dissenting, conceded that corporate speech
is within the scope of first amendment protections but considered the state interests sufficient to justify the statute.4" Corpo44. "If appellee's arguments were supported by record or legislative findings that
corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic process, thereby
denigrating rather than serving First Amendment interests, these arguments would
merit our consideration." Id. at 789 (emphasis added). Justice White, in his dissenting
opinion, found that the facts presented by the appellees proved corporate domination.
Id. at 810 (White, J., dissenting). Although the majority seems to have recognized this
state interest as justifying some restrictions, it seems it would have taken overwhelming evidence to prove the state interest.
45. The statute was underinclusive because it singled out a particular ballot
question (individual income tax) undermining the likelihood of a genuine state interest
in protecting shareholders. The statute did not prohibit corporations from lobbying or
from carrying on other corporate advocacy on a public issue, until it became the
subject of a referendum. For the text of the statute, see note 2, supra.
The overinclusiveness was demonstrated by the fact that the statute prohibited
corporate advocacy even if shareholders were unanimously in favor of such action. 435
U.S. at 794.
46. Id. at 796. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
47. See notes 22, 23 & 30, supra.
48. 435 U.S. at 802 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 804, 809-10 (White, J., dissenting).
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rate speech, except for that of corporations formed for the purposes of advancing ideological causes,50 is not a form of communication which furthers the self-expression of individual shareholders. Shareholders in a profit-oriented corporation are
united by a common desire to make money. This unanimity of
purpose breaks down when there is no business purpose in the
communication and the motive is merely the advancement of
management's political views. 5' Therefore, Justice White believed that Massachusetts' restrictions on corporate advocacy
were justified by the compelling state interest in preventing
corporate managers from using funds to promote ideas that did
not further the business interests of the corporation. He also
concluded that the state's interest in preserving the integrity
of the electoral process and preventing corruption was furthered by the statute; if corporations' communications were
left unchecked, their vast economic power would lead to control, not only of the economy but of the electoral process. 5
Only Justice Rehnquist believed that corporate freedom of
speech should be limited to issues that materially affect the
corporation's property or assets." Justice Rehnquist distinguished the holding in Grosjean as being limited to allowing a
corporation engaged in the business of publishing or broadcasting to have the same freedom of the press that is enjoyed by
5
natural persons. '
50. See text at notes 31 & 32, supra.
51. "Thus when a profitmaking corporation contributes to a political candidate
this does not further the self-expression or self-fulfillment of its shareholders in the way
that expenditures from them as individuals would." 435 U.S. at 806 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), struck
down limitations on individual expenditures because they directly restricted the right
of individuals to speak their minds. At the same time, however, the Court upheld
contribution limitations as being only an indirect restriction upon an individual's
ability to freely communicate ideas. Corporate expenditures would be analogous to this
latter restriction as only indirectly restricting shareholders' self-expression.
52. 435 U.S. at 809.
53. Id. at 828 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54. There can be little doubt that when a State creates a corporation. ..
it necessarily and implicitly guarantees that the corporation will not be deprived of that property absent due process of law. Likewise, when a State charters a corporation for the purpose of publishing a newspaper, it necessarily assumes that the corporation is entitled to the liberty of press essential to the
conduct of its business. . . . It cannot be so readily concluded that the right of
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Apparently, Bellotti gives corporations freedom of speech
protection equal to that of individuals." However, a corporation should not be given speech protection in issues that do not
affect the corporate property; once the property aspect is removed the speech becomes the purely personal view of corporate management, undeserving of the constitutional protection
afforded by Bellotti. The only justification provided by the
Court was the right of the public to receive such ideas and
information." However, corporations with vast economic resources and marketing expertise may "drown out" "smaller"
voices, thus misleading the public as to the level of support for
a particular point of view." Ceilings on corporate contributions, rather than an absolute prohibition, could prevent such
corporate abuse. 8 This would allow the strengths and weaknesses of each position to be assessed on the basis of logic and
reasoning and not according to the sheer volume of its exposure.
Legislation restricting corporate political advocacy will be
subject, as a result of Bellotti, to the strict scrutiny demanded
by the first amendment. 9 However, the holding in Bellotti
political expression is equally necessary to carry out the functions of a corporation organized for commercial purposes.
Id. at 824-25 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See text at notes 20-23,
supra.
55. The Court, however, did recognize that under different circumstances a
"justification for a restriction on speech that would be inadequate as applied to individuals might suffice to sustain the same restriction as applied to corporations, unions,
or like entities." 435 U.S. at 777-78 n.13.
56. See text at notes 39-40, supra.
57. Comment, CorporatePoliticalAffairs Program, 70 YALE L.J. 821, 826 (1961).
The Court answered this contention by providing that the source of the advertisement
should be disclosed to enable people to evaluate more accurately the arguments to
which they are exposed. 435 U.S. at 792 n.32.
58. Brief for Appellants at 76, First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978).
59. In first amendment cases, the Supreme Court is least likely to accept governmental interests not considered by the relevant decision maker. The Court also requires an especially close nexus between the ends and the means. The statute must
be narrowly drawn to achieve the objectives of the government without unnecessarily
reaching expressive conduct protected by the first amendment. In short, government
must come forward with sufficient proof to convincingly justify its abridgment of first
amendment rights. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-8, at 603 (1978).
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should not be extended to include candidate elections." The
state has an overriding interest in preserving the integrity of
the electoral process. The possibility of corruption is much
greater in candidate elections than in referendum votes. Large
contributions to candidates have the potential for creating
debts that can be paid by elected candidates in the form of
favors or passage of special-interest legislation. 6 ' In contrast,
corporate expenditures on issues before the general electorate
create no obligation to the corporation on the part of the voters.6" Prevention of this corruption in candidate elections justifies legislation limiting corporate advocacy.
Statutes analogous to the Massachusetts statute are currently in force in a majority of the states,63 and similar restrictions are embodied in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act." Generally, the purpose of this type of legislation is to prevent undue
influence or corruption of the electoral process that may result
from large corporate contributions 5 and to protect minority
60. Appellants did not challenge the constitutionality of the statute dealing with
candidate elections. 435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
61. Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844, 851 (2d Cir. 1974).
62. Id. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26, where
the Court said: "Congress might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger
of real or apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence
candidate elections."
63. Currently 31 states have enacted statutes restricting contributions in various
ways, the following 26 states singling out corporations for special treatment: ALA. CODE
tit. 17-22-3 (1976); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-471(A) (1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-4-3-3
(Burns 1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 56.29 (1976); KAN. STAT. § 25-1709 (1973); Ky. REv.
STAT. §§ 121.025, 121.035 (1976); LA. R.S. 18:1482-83 (Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit.
21, § 1395.2 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 55 § 8 (West 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 210A.34 (West 1975); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227 (1975); N.H. REy. STAT. ANN. §
70:2(I) (1955); N.J. REv. STAT. § 19:34-45 (1930); N.Y. ELEc. LAW § 14-116 (McKinney
1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.19 (1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-20-08 (1975); OHIO
REy. CODE ANN. § 3599.03 (Page 1953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 15-110 (1976); OR. REV.
STAT. § 260.472 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3225(b) (Purdon 1943); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 12-25-2 (1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-1932 (1972); TX. ELEC. CODE ANN.
Art. 14.06 (Vernon 1977); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-8 (1978); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 11.38(1)(a)(1)
(West 1975); WYo. STAT. § 22-25-102 (1977).
64. Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1976). The Act deals with
contributions or expenditures for any election to a political office, primary election, or
political convention or caucus. This Act prohibits corporate advocacy only in canditate
elections and therefore may be constitutional. See text at notes 60-62, supra.
. 65. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1947). This case involved a union, but
it is generally conceded that the same rationale would apply to corporations. 93 CONG.
REC. 6438 (1947).
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shareholders' interests.". Significantly, these same interests did
not justify the Massachusetts statute in Bellotti.67
The Court's trend in recent decisions, such as Bellotti, has
been to decide if the "speech" falls within the scope of first
amendment protection, disregarding the nature of the
9 a prisoner's communicaspeaker."8 In Procunierv. Martinez"
tion was protected from governmental interference by the first
amendment. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona ° attorneys' advertisements were held to be protected by the first amendment
because they served societal interests in assuring informed
decision-making. In City of Boston v. Anderson7 Justice Brennan stayed a judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court72 enjoining the City of Boston, a municipality, from expending funds to influence the vote in a state election. Brennan
stated that if the judgment were allowed to stand, Boston
would be prohibited from exercising its first amendment rights.
In all these cases the speaker, whether a corporation, prisoner,
attorney, or municipality, was granted first amendment protection. However, even though the type of speaker was irrelevant to the extension of first amendment protection, status can
play an important role in determining whether the state has an
interest concerning the particular speaker that will justify restrictions on freedom of speech. Therefore, in the future, given
proper circumstances, legislation limiting corporate advocacy
may be justified by the governmental interests asserted in
Bellotti. 3 Even in the proper situation, however, Bellotti seems
66. Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
67. See notes 44-45, supra.
68. "The proper question therefore is not whether corporations 'have' First
Amendment rights . . . ,[but] whether § 8 abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776.
69. 416 U.S. 396 (1974). The unique governmental interests that may justify
restrictions on free speech of inmates are security, order, and rehabilitation.
70. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The state interests that must justify restrictions on
attorneys' free speech (advertising) are generally the maintenance of the quality and
dignity of attorneys and the prevention of undesirable effects on the administration
of justice.
71. 99 S. Ct. 50 (1978). The state interest asserted was the same as in Bellotti,
fairness of elections. This interest was again not sufficient.
72. Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628 (Mass. 1978).
73. See text at notes 42-43, supra.
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to require that the need to restrict speech be well-documented
and that the statutory restriction be precisely limited to addressing that need.
George W Scofield

WRONGFUL DEATH: PRESCRIPTION? PEREMPTION? CONFUSION!

Plaintiffs parents were murdered by an unknown assailant during an apparent robbery. It was more than two years
later before the identity of the alleged murderer was established when an inmate of the state penitentiary, who was free
on a weekend pass at the time of the crime, was indicted for
this offense. Plaintiff then sued the State Department of
Corrections for damages arising from the wrongful death of her
parents.' The First Circuit, reversing the trial court, held that
the one year period in which a wrongful death action must be
brought is not a period of peremption but rather is the one year
prescriptive period of article 3536 of the Civil Code,' which had
been suspended by the application of the doctrine of contranon
valentem.3 McClendon v. State Departmentof Corrections,357
So. 2d 1218 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).1
1. Plaintiff contended that the Department should be held (1) strictly liable or
(2) negligent for granting a furlough to a man with two prior homicides on his record.
Plaintiff also claimed damages for personal property allegedly stolen by the murderer.
2.
ages

"The following actions are . . . prescribed by one year: . . . [t]hat for damresulting from offenses or quasi offenses." LA. Crv. CoDE art. 3536.

. . .

3. Contra non valentem agere non curritprescriptio means no prescription runs
against a person unable to bring an action. Aegis Ins. Co. v. Delta Fire & Cas. Co., 99
So. 2d 767, 772 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
4. This note will not discuss the holding that the applicable time limitation for
an action for damages to the property of the deceased provided by article 2315 to the
deceased's legal heirs is the one year prescriptive period of article 3536. Though this is
apparently the first case in which the question arose, there was little doubt that the
time limitation for damages to the deceased's property was the prescriptive period of
article 3536. See Johnson, Death on the Callais Coach: The Mystery of Louisiana
Wrongful Death and Survival Actions, 37 'LA. L. Rv. 1, 31 n.148 (1976).
Neither will this note discuss the general application of the doctrine of contra non
valentem in Louisiana. For the application of the doctrine in Louisiana, see generally
Hyman v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 139 La. 411, 71 So. 598 (1916); Dagenhart v.
Robertson Truck Lines, Inc., 230 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Note, Offenses
and Quasi-Offenses-Prescription-Contra
Non Valentem, 32 Tut. L. REv. 783 (1958).

